The industry's strongest players -- Toyota and Honda in Japan, BMW and Daimler in Germany -- have fewer brands. They shun (or unwind) acquisitions because they drain resources, create distractions and pollute corporate cultures. Instead, they focus on making what they have better, not getting bigger. That none of those companies is joining Feinberg's feeding frenzy says as much about them as it does about GM. Second, GM's leadership historically has been deliberate, generous and humane, a corporate paternalism evinced in former CEO Robert Stempel's inability to pull the trigger on massive plant closings in the early '90s. His successor, Jack Smith, showed similar reluctance. Ditto Rick Wagoner, the current boss. Could GM's brass muster the guts to dismember Chrysler with the speed necessary to extract proposed savings before the extra cash runs out? If so, it would be out of character for Wagoner & Co. and a startling commentary on the seriousness of GM's predicament. The General spent billions of shareholder dollars over several years to close plants, sell assets, cut benefits and eliminate tens of thousands of jobs -- nothing like the Chrysler blood-letting that would be needed in much less time. Third, government bailouts are voguish again, with a would-be GM-Chrysler commingling evoking comparisons to Britain's nationalization of its failing auto industry in the 1970s. How enthusiastically would a new White House and a presumably more Democratic Congress embrace GM's push for a bailout, which appears increasingly obvious, if that would mean publicly financing the combined company's fratricide and ensuing fallout? Conversely, how would taxpayers -- especially those outside the industry's strongholds -- like seeing their dollars used to buy out union workers, cut severance checks to salaried employees, wind down assembly plants and shrink dealer networks? Not exactly the same thing as doing your part to rescue the global financial system, which doesn't mean GM isn't planning to make the pitch anyway. Fourth, given GM's record at delivering shareholder value -- namely, not much of one in North America -- why should anyone believe they could do it this time? Lots of good, honest people work at Chrysler, but the sad truth is that Detroit's smallest automaker has been living on borrowed time for more than a decade. The Germans from Daimler-Benz AG couldn't make it work. Cerberus' dream team of GE's Bob Nardelli, Toyota's Jim Press and Chrysler's Tom LaSorda couldn't do it. So GM can? Based on what -- hope? Even allowing for the fact that vast portions of Chrysler would be relegated to history, even as some plants would continue producing some products, the question that first springs to mind is, why? A potential GM-Cerberus deal for Chrysler arguably couldn't come at a worse time. Michigan's economy is slipping deeper into the proverbial tank now that the national economy is slowing markedly. Government solutions to economic problems are becoming politically acceptable, while business leaders are suspect because too often their decision-making is seen to be privatizing the profits before socializing the losses, real and perceived. Would a GM-Chrysler deal be any different? Oh, they'll say so, but I doubt it. And I'm not alone. Daniel Howes' column runs Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays. He can be reached at (313) 222-2106, [email protected] or detnews.com/howes.